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Case Comment

IN RE MARSHALL (DECEASED), BARCLAY'S BANK LTD. V. MARSHALL AND
OTHERS - ADOPTION - FOREIGN ADOPTION - CONFLICTS OF LAW RIGHTS OF CHILD UNDER ENGLISH WILL - Some confugion has been

caused in the conflict of laws by the failure to distinguish between
status and its incidents, especially when related to a question
of succession. A striking example of this sort of confusion
is to be found in the case of In Re Marshall, Barclay's Bank
Ltd. v. Marshall.1 A testator bequeathed his estate in England
to trustees in trust for his widow for life, and on her death to certain
named cousins of whom Charles Stansfeld Jones was one. The testator died domiciled in England in June 1945 and his widow died in
January 1955. Charles Stansfeld Jones died in 1950 and was survived by a son whom he had adopted according to the law of British
Columbia in March 1945. The son claimed as his adoptive father's
"issue" under a substitution clause in the testator's will. A girl who
had not been adopted by a court order also claimed as "issue" of
Jones, but her claim was dismissed on the ground that she had not
been "legally" adopted. 2 The parties to the adoption were at all relevant times domiciled in British Columbia. It was agreed by the
parties to the action that "issue" was to be the same as "children" in
construing the testator's will.
At the trial Harman, J. held that the relevant date for ascertaining the class of persons capable of taking under the substitution clause
of the will was the date of the testator's death, June 1945. His Lordship considered the British Columbia law as it existed at that date and
decided that according to that law "... the status of an adopted person
is only equated to that of a natural born child so far as regards the
legal descendants of his adoptive parents."'3 He held that the adopted
son was not, in 1945, a person within the class of persons capable of
taking under the clause in question.
Having decided the case on the basis that 1945 was the relevant
date, his Lordship went on to consider what the result would have been
had the relevant date been that of the death of the life tenant, the
widow, in 1955. Examining the amendments to The Adoption Act4
of British Columbia, and especially the 1953 amendment to Section
10 (1) - of that Act, his Lordship was of the opinion that the deletion of
the words "the legal descendants, but to no other of" from that section
1 [1957] Ch. 507, the appeal was from the judgment of Harman, J., [1957]
Ch. 263; 1 All E.R. 549. The Chancery report incorrectly quotes s. 12 of the
British Columbia Adoption Act, and the section is properly quoted in [1957]
1 All E.R. 549.
2 Kennedy (1957), 35 Can. Bar Rev. 880 at p. 883 indicates, however, that
the method of adoption used in the case of the daughter, viz. by agreement
and not by a court order, at the time operated as an adoption under the laws
of British Columbia, if the agreement was filed with the provincial secretary.
The case does not indicate whether or not this was done.
3 [1957] 1 All E.R. 549 at p. 553.
4 R.S.B.C., 1948, c. 7.
5S. 10(1): As to inheritance and succession to real and personal property
a person adopted according to the provisions of this Act shall, subject to
the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 3, stand in regard to the legal
descendants, but to no other of the kindred of his parent by adoption, in the
same position as if born to that parent in lawful wedlock.
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had the effect of placing an adopted person with "regard to the kindred
of his parent by adoption in the same position as if born of that
parent in lawful wedlock". 6 The adopted son would have succeeded,
therefore, on this basis, "if the British Columbia legislation were to
be followed in England". 7 It is submitted, however, that Section 10(1)
here referred to by his Lordship was quite irrelevant, in that its
purpose and effect was only to prescribe certain incidents of a status
in British Columbia, viz. an adopted child's rights of inheritance and
succession in British Columbia, under a British Columbia will.
The learned trial judge used the correct approach to the problem
in this case but, with the greatest respect he was unable to surmount
the final obstacle, the distinction between status and its incidents.
His Lordship in discussing the recent cases of Be Wilby,8 and In Be
Wilson, Grace v. Lucas9 was careful to disassociate himself from the
view expressed by Vaisey, J. in the latter case and followed by Barnard, J. in the former, that the British Courts for the purpose of succession to an English estate will recognize an adoption only if effected
under the English Adoption Act of 1950. His Lordship, in referring
to the decision of Barnard, J., had this comment to make:
"He, [Barnard, J.] was impressed with the difficulty for an English judge
of estimating the effect of foreign systems of law. This is no doubt
formidable, but it is a task often faced. It is in English courts a question
of fact to be ascertained on proper evidence of skilled persons'.10

Referring to the case of Re Donald, Baldwin v. Mooney, 11 a
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, which held that the legitimation cases were not applicable to a case of adoption, Harman, J.
found that the case "has not received universal approval". 12 The
Court in Be Donald was called upon to consider a substitution clause
in a will in circumstance similar to those in In re Marshall, but at
the relevant time in the Canadian case, which arose in Saskatchewan,
adoption of children was unknown in the law of that province. The
question in that case was whether a foreign legal relationship of a
kind unknown in the province would put the child in question in the
position of a legitimate child in the eyes of Saskatchewan law.
Smith, J. who delivered the judgment in the Supreme Court of
Canada, held that the adopted child's claim ". .. is not a question of
status, but a question of whether this adopted child is a person such
as mentioned and described in this bequest."' 3 It is difficult to understand how such a contention could have been asserted in the light
of the authorities, and in view of the nature of status itself. The
substitution clause in Re Donald directed a gift to "children", and
6 [1957] 1 All E.R. 549 at p. 554.
7 Ibid.
8 [19563 P. 174; 1 All E.R. 27.
9 [19543 Ch. 733; 1 All E.R. 997.
10 [1957] 1 All E.R. 549 at p. 556.
n1 [19293 2 D.L.R. 244.

12 [1957] 1 All E.R. 549 at 555, citing Re Pearson, [1946] V.L.R. 356 at p.
361 and Re Brophy, [1949] N.Z.L.R. 1006.
Is [1929] 2 D.L.R. 244 at p. 247.
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the only question to be decided was whether or not the claimant,
who had been adopted under the laws of the State of Washington,
was a "child" of the person through whom he claimed. It is submitted that this was clearly a question of status, going to the very
root of the relationship between that child and his adoptive parent.
The court was impressed by the view that "child" referred exclusively
to the result of the procreative act. Unfortunately this view fails
to comprehend the idea that "child" necessarily implies a relationship,
that of parent and child. To say that this relationship can be achieved
only by a person who is the result of the procreative act of the
person with whom it is desired to establish that relationship is to
disregard entirely the concept of adoption. The Court held that the
claimant could not succeed under Saskatchewan law because he was
not in fact the offspring of his adoptive parent.
The decision of the Court of Appeal in In re Marshall delivered
4
by Romer, L.J., echoes the strict thinking of Boyes v. Bedale,'
where Sir W. Page-Wood, V.C. said
".. . the testator giving a legacy to the child of E. B. Clegg must be
taken to mean a 15child in the sense in which the law of England understands the term,"

and further
"If an intestate dies domiciled in England the division of his property is
governed throughout by English law and no person could take by representation under that statute unless legitimate by the aw of England."16

Perhaps one would not disagree with this reasoning if it were
clear that the italicized references to English law were meant to
include the English rules of conflict of laws as well as the local law.
Unfortunately it would appear that "English law" as used in the
passages quoted has been interpreted as referring only to the local
law.
Romer, L.J. stated in In re MarshaZl,
"It is established beyond controversy that when an English testator
speaks of "the children" of A. he is prima facie taken to be referring
only to those persons of whom it can be postulated that they are the
lawful children of A. The rule is clearly stated in Hawkins on Wills,
3rd ed., at p. 102. Further than, and by analogy to this, 17we agree with
the view which Roxburgh, J. expressed in In Re Fletcher to the effect
that adopted children are prima facie excluded by the rule equally with
illegitimate children. If, then, a different intention is to be attributed
to a testator, so far as adopted children of foreign domicile are concerned, the rule should not be departed from, in our judgment, further
than is necessary; and it is neither permissible nor possible to suppose
that the testator intended to bring into the category of children all
persons who have been adopted under the lex domicilii, however limited
the effect of their adoption may be. It seems to us that only those who
are placed by adoption in a position both as regards property and status,
equivalent or at all events substantially equivalent, to that of the natural

14 (1863), 1 H. & M. 798; 71 E.R. 349.

15
16

Ibid., at p. 804.

Ibid., at p. 805.
17 [1949] Ch. 473; 1 All E.R. 732.
Roxburgh, J. left open the question as
might have legitimate status according
would be considered as a "lawful child"

It
to
to
in

should be noted, however, that
whether or not an adopted child
the law of his domicil, and if so
an English court.
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children of the adopter can be treated as being within the scope of the
testator's contemplation."'Is

It would appear, according to Romer, L.J. that in order to take
under a bequest to "children" in an English will, a foreign adopted
child must be in a position equivalent to that of a legitimate child
under English law. Again no objection is taken to this statement
if what is meant is, according to the whole of English law including
its conflict rules. An adopted child is not to be grouped with an
illegitimate child as the quotation from In Re Fletcherwould indicate.
The similarity, if any, it is submitted, is closer to that of the position
of a legitimate child, as was suggested by Harman, J. at the trial
when he stated that adoption was "a kind of legitimation". 19 With
great respect, it is the writer's submission that the learned Judge
was wrong in suggesting that reference should be had to the position
of an adopted child with regard to property rights as well as status
in attempting to equate its position to that of a natural child. How
a person's rights with regard to property in another jurisdiction can
have any relevance to the question of whether or not that person is
a child of Its adoptive parent is, with respect, beyond the powers of
the present writer's understanding.
The Court of Appeal held that the claimant in In re Marshall
was not in a position at least substantially equivalent to that of a
natural child of Charles Stansfeld Jones, and hence he was not
within the range of the testator's contemplation, with the result that
his claim was dismissed. The ratio of the case may fairly be expressed
as follows:
(1) English law (the lex successionis) prima facie interprets "child" as
"legitimate child".
(2) Adoption establishes a statutory relationship between the adopted
child and its adoptive parent, but the nature of this relationship
depends on the statute under which it is created.
(3) Even if "child" in an English will may sometimes include "adopted
child", nevertheless the testator was thinking of lawfully procreated
children so that only those who are placed by adoption in a position,
both as regards property and status, equivalent or at all events
substantially equivalent, to that of the natural children of the
adopter can be treated as being within the scope of the testators
contemplation.

Prima facie, the question in the case was one of succession to
an English estate, but this involved an investigation into to who were
the children of Charles Stansfeld Jones. Unless an intention to the
contrary on the part of the testator is established, the construction
of a will of movables is governed by the law of the place which was
the testator's domicil immediately before his death. 20 In In re
Marshalthe Court was not concerned with succession to immoveables,
and it was agreed that the testator's domicil at the time immediately
18 [1957] Ch. 507 at pp. 522, 523.

19 [19571 1 All E.R. 549 at p. 556.
20Beadford v. Young (1884), 26 Ch. D. 656, and (1885), 29 Ch. D. 617.
See also, Dicey's Conflict of Laws (7th ed.) at p. 614. Rule 118 refers to the
domicil of the testator at the time the will is made. Cheshire, PrivateInter.
national Law (3rd ed.), at p. 705 refers to the law of the domicil of the
testator at his death.
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prior to his death was England. The question of succession, therefore, fell to be decided by the law of England, including the English
rules of private international law. The Court had to characterize
the question of who were the "children" of Charles Stansfeld Jones.
If this problem were characterized as one of status, the matter would
fall to be decided by the law of the claimant's domicile, British
Columbia, since the English rule of construction interprets "child"
as being "legitimate child" but goes no further.
That the matter is a question of status is difficult to deny in the
light of the decision of the English Court of Appeal in In Be Goodman's
2
Trusts, where it was stated by James, L.J., 1
"But the question is, what is the rule which the English law adopts and
applies to a non-English child? That is a question of international
comity and international law. According to that law as recognized and
that comity as practised in all other civilized communities, the status
of a person, his legitimacy or his illegitimacy, is to be determined everywhere by the law of the country of his origin....1"
The point was considered also in In re Andros, a decision of Kay, J.

in Chancery, where it was stated,2
"A bequest in an English will to the children of A means to his legitimate
children, but the rule of construction goes no further. The question
remains, who are his legitimate children. That certainly is not a question
of the construction of the will. It is a question of status .... The law,
as I understand it, is that a bequest of personality in an English will to
the children of a foreigner means to his legitimate children, and that
by international law, as recognized in this country, those children are
legitimate whose legitimacy is established by the law of the father's
domicil."
The passage quoted was considered with approval by Romer, J. in
the Bischoffsheim case,2 3 and one wonders whether Romer, L.J. in
In re Marshall might not be guilty of some inconsistency in avoiding
the issue when he says in the latter case,2 4
"This view of the judge (Harman, J. at the trial) is largely based upon
the application to adoption of principles which have become well established in relation to legitimation by such cases as In re Goodman's Trust,
and In re Andros, that is to say, that the relevant inquiry in such cases
as the present is as to the status of the adopted child and can only be
answered by reference to the domiciliary law of the child and the adopter
which, when proved, will be accepted and applied by our courts. This
has been regarded as25the right approach to26the problem in for example,
27
Purcel v. Hendrics and In re Brophy and In re Pearson.
As
against this, Mr. Baden Fuller (counsel for the heirs, other than the
adopted son) argued before us that no adopted child in the position of the
appellant can take under a gift in an English will to the "child" of the
adopter, however extensive the language of the relevant foreign legislation may be. Mr. Baden Fuller's contention is (apart from the provisions of the Adoption Act, 1950 which are irrelevant for present
purposes) under a gift to the child of A. in an English will no one can
take unless he can show that he is in fact the child of A. -iz.
the resuZt
of the procreative act of A. The appellant, says Mr. Baden Fuller, was
21 (1881), 17 Ch.D. 266 at 296.
(1883), 24 Ch. D. 637 at 639.
[1948] Ch.79.
[1957] Ch. 507 at pp. 519, 520.
[1925] 3 D.L.R. 854 (B.C. C.A.).
[1949] N.Z.L.R. 1006.
[1946] V.L.R. 356.

22
23
24
25
26
27
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not the child of Charles Stansfeld Jones in this sense and the legislation
of British Columbia could not turn him into one. This way of looking
at the matter has the28 unanimous support of the Supreme Court of
Canada in In re Donald.

It is submitted that the problem elaborated in the passage which
has just been quoted was at least the very question which fell to be
decided in In re Marshall. The Court of Appeal held otherwise, however, and in the words of Romer, L.J., decided that,
".... it is unnecessary for us to express any concluded opinion on whether
the appellant or the respondents are right upon this difficult question
and we prefer to refrain from doing so."29

A child is not legitimate in the air, so to speak. It is legitimate
in relation to another person, its father, and it is the relationship
which must be looked to to determine its status. In the legitimation
cases the courts have been concerned with the question of whether
or not a person was the legitimate child of another. The fact that
that particular child was the result of the procreative act of that
person could not have been of any assistance to the court In deciding
upon its status for in all of the cases it was assumed that this state
of affairs existed. What did, however, concern the courts was the
relationship of the child in question to 'its alleged parent. In effect
it was the relationship itself which constituted the essence of the
child's status in such cases. Why Romer, L.J. and the Supreme
Court of Canada should refuse to look to the relationship between
an adopted child and its adoptive parent is difficult to understand.
The relationship can be taken one step further and be described as
that of parent and legitimate child. It will be observed then that the
relationship may be established in one of three ways viz. by birth in
lawful wedlock, by legitimation, or by adoption. Once this relationship exists the status is established and persons who have entered
into it in any one of the three ways are properly described as
"children."
It has already been stated that "child" in an English will means
"legitimate child", but in attempting to ascertain the intention of an
English testator it is difficult to go much further than his rule of
construction. Did the testator intend to refer to children legitimate
by the local law of England or children in fact legitimate by their
be found
own personal law? How can the answer to this question
30
"within the scope of the testator's contemplation?"
In deciding that it was unnecessary to give a concluded opinion
on the argument that the question of the position of the claimant
in In re Marshall was one of status, the Court of Appeal in effect
decided the fate of the adopted child's claim. It is surprising to
note how little reference is made to the authorities in arriving at this
conclusion. Having stated in In re Marshall that the position of the
adopted child could not be argued on the strength of the legitimacy
cases, Romer L.J. discussed the construction and effect of the British
28 [19291 2 D.L.R. 244.

29 [1957] Ch. 507 at p. 520.
3O Ibid., at p. 523.
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Columbia adoption legislation at the various times in question. Particular reference was made to those sections of that legislation.
Dealing with the proprietary right of an adopted child in that province. It is understandable that reference might properly have been
had to the British Columbia law to ascertain whether or not by that
law the relationship of parent and child between the claimant and
Charles Stansfeld Jones had been established. It can hardly be denied
that this relationship did exist. What relevance the property rights
of that child in British Columbia may have had to its rights of
succession in England is difficult to comprehend.
It has been stated at the outset of this article that questions of
succession to movables must be decided according to the lex successionis or the law of the domicil of the testator at his death.3 1 Surely
this child's property rights on the succession in issue should have
been decided by that law and not by the law of his domicil. The
soundness of this assertion becomes clear upon examination of a
hypothetical situation. Suppose that A dies intestate in country X,
survived only by a nephew B and a niece C, and that B is domiciled
country X, and C in country Y. Suppose further that according to
the law of Y, on the intestacy of an uncle a nephew takes to the
exclusion of a niece, and that according to the law of X both would
share equally. Would it be in accordance with rules of private
international law for the courts of country X, to decide that because
C is encumbered as to succession in this situation by the law of her
domicil, therefore she cannot take by the law of country X, the Tex
successionis? It is submitted that such a result would be obviously
wrong. It is to be noted, however, that both B and C in the example
have the same "status" by their respective personal law, but they
do not have the same rights as to property within their respective
countries. 32 It Is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this was the
sort of reasoning used by the Court of Appeal in In re Marshall.
The tendency appears to have been to look to its incidents to
determine a status, rather than to look to a status to determine its
incidents where they are relevant. One writer 33 has analyzed the
fallacy of this approach, in stating that it is not because a man must
maintain his wife that he is married but rather it is because he is
married that he must maintain his wife.
In looking to the law of British Columbia, the Court should have
endeavoured to ascertain whether or not the relationship of parent
and child existed between the claimant and Charles Stansfeld Jones.
If such a relationship did exist, as was apparently the case, the Court
should have held the claimant to be properly described as a "child"
in terms of the substitution clause. The Court might then have
See ante footnote 20.
See ante footriote is.
Inglis, Adoption, The Marshall Case (1957), 35 Can. Bar Rev. 1027 at
p. 1035. For a discussion of the decision of Harman, J. at the trial, see Inglis
(1957), 35 Can. Bar Rev. 571 and p. 884.
31

32
33
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inquired as to whether or not there existed in English law (the lex
successionis) a rule of succession which precluded a "child" who
has become such by adoption from taking under a gift to "children"
in an English will.34
CARL GRANT *

M
Mr. Grant is presently enrolled in the fourth year of Osgoode Hall Law
School.
34 The difficulty in this case might now be overcome in Ontario by virtue
of the provisions of The Child Welfare Act, 1958, c. 11, especially sections
74 and 75. See also Re Milestone, [1959] 15 D.L.R. (2d) 546.

